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CONGRESSIONAL PROHIBITION OF CONTEMPTUOUS
FLAG BURNING SUPPRESSES CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED FREE SPEECH
Congress can create and regulate the uses of the American flag' by
exercising its power to prescribe laws concerning respect for,2 and display
of,3 the flag. Congress made knowingly casting contempt on any United
States flag by publicly burning it a misdemeanor in section 700 of Title
18 of the United States Code.4 Persons convicted, in both federal and state
cases,5 of desecrating the American flag have argued that flag desecra-
tion statutes violate the first amendment.' The United States Supreme
I See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 586 (1974) (White, J., concurring). Congress' con-
stitutional authority to provide for the general welfare, regulate commerce, and provide
for defense, combined with the necessary and proper clause, includes the choosing and regula-
tion of the national flag, the symbol of our nation. Id.; see U.S. CONsT. art. I, 5 8, cl. 1 (Con-
gress' authority to provide for general welfare and common defense); U.S. CONST. art. I,
S 8, cl. 3 (Congress' authority to regulate commerce; U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, ci. 18 (Con-
gress' authority to make all laws necessary and proper to execute Congress' powers).
' See 36 U.S.C. 5 176 (1976). Congress has provided that no disrespect should be shown
to the United States flag. For example, the flag should never touch the ground or be used
as wearing apparel. See id. S 176(b) & (d). The flag should never be used as advertising.
See id. 5 176(i). If a flag is no longer fit for display, its owner should destroy the flag in
a dignified way by burning it. See id. S 176(k).
See 36 U.S.C. § 174 (1976) (times and occasions for flag display). Congress has pro-
vided that the flag should be displayed only during daylight. See id. S 174(a). The flag should
not be displayed in inclement weather. See id. S 174(c). The flag should be displayed every
day, especially on national holidays. See id. S 174(d).
' See 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1976). Section 700 provides that "[W]hoever knowingly casts
contempt upon any flag of the United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burn-
ing, or trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both." Id. § 700(a).
As used in § 700, "flag of the United States," includes:
... any flag; standard colors, ensign, or any picture or representation of either,
or of any part or parts of either, made of any substance or represented on any
substance, of any size evidently purporting to be either of said flag, standard,
color or ensign of the United States of America, or a picture or representation
of either, upon which shall be shown the colors, the stars and stripes, in any number
of either thereof, or any part or parts of either by which the average person see-
ing the same without deliberation may believe the same to represent the flag,
standards, colors, or ensign of the United States of America.
Id. S 700(b).
I See United States v. Kime, 673 F.2d 1318, 1318 (4th Cir.) (defendant convicted under
section 700 of burning flag during public demonstration), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 266 (1982);
see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,577-78 (1969) (New York statute that made casting
contempt upon the flag by word or act a crime is unconstitutional); United States v. Crosson,
462 F.2d 96, 98 (9th Cir.) (defendant convicted under 5 700 of publicly burning flag), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
6 See Kime v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 266, 267 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defendant
unsuccessfully contended S 700 was unconstitutional violation of first amendment), denying
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Court, however, has refused to hold the federal flag desecration statute
unconstitutional.
7
The first amendment protects freedom of speech from congressional
infringement.' The Supreme Court has ruled that the fourteenth amend-
ment protects freedom of speech from state infringement. 9 Speech means
not only the spoken or the written word but also communicative conduct."0
The Supreme Court has held, for example, that wearing a military uniform
to protest the Vietnam war," taping a peace symbol on the American flag
to protest the Vietman war,1' and displaying a communist flag' are forms
of symbolic speech14 entitled to first amendment protection. The right of
freedom of speech, however, is not absolute." Just because an individual
cert. to 673 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir. 1982).
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
protects the right to freedom of speech from state infringement. See Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1942) (fourteenth amendment protects freedom of speech
from state infringment); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (due process clause pro-
hibits states from abriding free speech); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (free
speech included in liberties protected by due process clause from state infringement); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1 (states may not deprive anyone of life, liberty, or proper-
ty without due process of law).
' See Kime v. United States, 673 F.2d 1318, 1318 (4th Cir.) (defendant convicted of
violating S 700), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 266 (1982).
' See supra note 6 (first amendment prohibits Congress from abridging freedom of
speech).
9 See supra note 6 (fourteenth amendment protects freedom of speech from state
infringment).
10 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969)
(communicative conduct of wearing black armbands was similar to spoken or written words
and entitled to full first amendment protection).
11 See Schacht v. United States, 398 US. 58, 62 (1970) (law prohibiting wearing of military
uniform in theatrical productions criticizing armed forces violated first amendment).
" See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (attaching peace symbol to
American flag as a political protest is free speech).
13 See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931) (display of a communist flag
is speech protected by the first amendment).
14 See Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 29, 30-33 & n.13 (1973). Pure speech is the written or spoken word. See id. at 31.
Symbolic speech is nonverbal communicative conduct. Id. at 31 n.13. Conduct is speech when
the actor intends to communicate meaning through his conduct, and the conduct actually
conveys some meaning to the actor's audience. Id. at 36. All communication, including pure
speech, depends on symbols, but not all symbols deserve first amendment protection. Id. at 33.
11 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). Freedom of speech is not an absolute
right. Id. The Supreme Court has held that speech that is likely to cause a clear and pres-
ent danger of serious public disturbance may be censored or punished. See id.; Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Statutes that regulate conduct and only incidentally infringe on speech are constitutional.
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 (1968); Konigsberg v. Bar of California,
366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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has communicated by means of pure or symbolic speech within the mean-
ing of the first amendment does not mean that a defendant's speech is
constitutionally protected." A state's interest in guarding against an im-
mediate breach of the peace, for example, may outweigh the right to free
speech.17 Therefore, for section 700 to be unconstitutional, flag burn-
ing not only must be speech, flag burning also must be constitutionally
protected speech. 8
In 1968, the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien,19 stated that
not all conduct is speech, despite the actor's intent to communicate an
idea." Since 1931, the Supreme Court has held, however, that flags and
the activities associated with flags are symbolic speech.2 In Stromberg
v. California," the Supreme Court stated that a California statute that
prohibited anyone from displaying a red flag in a public place as a symbol
of opposition to organized government was an unconstitutional abridge-
ment of free speech under the fourteenth amendment." The Stromberg
" See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376-382 (1968) (even if burning draft cards
is symbolic speech, congressional statute prohibiting draft card burning is not violation
of first amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942) (first amend-
ment does not prevent punishment for speaking "fighting words").
"7 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-308 (1940). The state has a legitimate
interest in protecting peace and order. Id. at 307. When freedom of speech presents an
immediate and substantial danger of public violence or disorder, the state's interest in pre-
serving public safety outweighs the right to free speech. Id. at 308. The state may not,
however, suppress free speech more than is necessary to protect peace and order. See id.
" See supra text accompanying notes 8-17 (only some speech is entitled to first amend-
ment protection).
19 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In United States v. O'Brien, O'Brien and three other men burned
their draft cards on the steps of a Boston courthouse. Id. at 369. The O'Brien Court upheld
O'Brien's conviction which was based on his violation of a federal statute that prohibited
a person from destroying his draft registration card. See id. at 369-70, 386.
1 See id. at 376. The O'Brien Court rejected the view that mere intent to express
an idea makes conduct speech. Id. The Supreme Court has stated that conduct must con-
tain sufficient communicative elements to come within freedom of speech protection. See
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974). One test for determining if conduct is sym-
bolic speech is whether the person engaging in the conduct intends to express an idea and
those witnessing the conduct actually derive some meaning from the conduct. See Nimme-,
supra note 14, at 36.
" See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (flag salute and
pledge are speech); Stromberg v. California 283 U.S. 359, 361, 368-69 (1931) (display of red
flag in political protest is speech).
283 U.S. 359 (1931).
- See id. at 360-61, 368-69. The defendant in Stromberg v. California was a summer
camp supervisor in California. Id. at 362. The camp taught, among other things, class con-
sciousness and the solidarity of workers. Id. As part of the daily schedule, camp members
saluted and pledged allegiance to a communist flag. Id. The Stromberg Court held that the
first amendment right of free speech applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. See id. at 368. The Stromberg Court also held that display of a flag in opposition
to government was symbolic speech and that prohibiting display of a flag as a symbol of
opposition was a violation of the constitutional right of free speech.
See id. at 368-69.
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Court held that flag display is symbolic speech entitled to freedom of
speech protection in certain contexts.14 Twelve years after Stromberg, in
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,' the Supreme Court held
that West Virginia authorities could not compel respect for the American
flag by requiring public school students to salute and pledge allegiance
to the flag. 6 The Barnette Court held that the salute and pledge were
symbolic speech protected under the first amendmentY West Virginia
enforced its flag respect statute by expelling from school insubordinate
children who refused to comply with the flag respect law.' Parents of
an expelled child were subject to state prosecution for contributing to
the delinquency of a minor.29 After Barnette, government officials could
not force citizens to salute or pledge allegiance to the flag.'
In Street v. New York, 3' the Supreme Court, relying on the Barnette
decision, held unconstitutional a New York statute that imposed criminal
penalties for casting contempt upon the American flag by word or act.2
The Street Court held that the "words" portion of the statute was an
abridgment of protected speech 3 The Supreme Court, however, declined
to consider whether the "act" portion of the statute violated the defend-
ant's right of free speech. 4 The Street Court balanced the government's
' Id. at 368-69.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
See id. at 642 (state statute compelling respect for American flag through flag salute
and pledge was unconstitutional infringment on freedom of speech).
' See id. at 632-33, 642. The Barnette Court stated that the American flag is a symbol
of our national system and our history. See id. at 632. The flag salute, in connection with
reciting the pledge of allegiance to the flag, is itself a form of speech. Id. West Virginia
required students to say the pledge of allegiance and give a "stiff-arm" salute, which some
parents found objectionable because they thought the required flag salute was similar to
the Nazi salute. Id. at 627-29. The Barnette Court held that the first amendment right of
freedom of speech, applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, forbade state
authorities from compelling the flag salute and pledge of allegiance. See id. at 637, 642.
Id. at 629.
29 Id.
I See supra note 26 (state statute compelling respect for American flag through flag
salute and pledge was unconstitutional infringement on freedom of speech).
3, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). In Street v. New York, after hearing of the murder of a civil
rights leader, the defendant went to a public intersection and burned his own United States
flag. Id. at 578. While the flag was burning in front of a crowd of about 30 people, including
a policeman, the defendant proclaimed that the United States no longer needed a "damn
flag." Id. at 578-79. The defendant was convicted in state court of violating a New York
statute that prohibited casting contempt upon the United States flag by word or act. Id.
at 577-78.
' See id. at 590-94. The Street Court held that the state could not prohibit disrespect-
ful words directed at the flag because such words were protected by the first amendment.
See id. at 593-94.
1 See id. at 590-91 (state statute prohibiting casting contempt upon American flag by
words violated right of freedom of speech).
I See id. at 594. The Street Court found that the judge who rendered the verdict against
the defendant could have relied on the defendant's words alone, or on both his words and
[Vol. 40:1541
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interests in protecting the flag with the defendant's right of free speech
and held the "words" part of the New York statute unconstitutional. 5 The
Street Court considered four governmental interests that possibly could
outweigh the defendant's right of free speech.' First, although states have
a legitimate interest in preventing incitement of unlawful acts, the
Supreme Court held that the defendant's words did not infringe on the
state's interest because his words did not advocate unlawful action.17 Sec-
ond, because the defendant's words were not "fighting words," 8 that is
words that themselves inflict injury or immediately incite violence against
the person who spoke the fighting words, the defendant's words did not
come within the state's interest in maintaining the peace. Third, the Street
Court held that, even if the defendant's words about the flag shocked
onlookers, the state's interest in protecting its citizens from witnessing
shocking events does not permit the state to prohibit offensive ideas."
Finally, relying on Barnette, the Street Court held that the defendant's
right to express his opinions overcame New York's interest in protecting
the flag as a national symbol."' Because the New York statute impinged
his act of burning the flag to find that the defendant violated the New York flag desecra-
tion statute. See id. at 586, 589-90. Because the Street Court decided that the "words" por-
tion of the statute was unconstitutional and that the defendant's words may have been
the basis for his conviction, the Street Court held the defendant's conviction unconstitu-
tional. See id. at 589-94. The Street Court relied on a long line of decisions authorizing the
Court to strike down a conviction if part of the statute upon which the conviction could
have been based is unconstitutional. See id. at 585-87; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
311 (1957); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1949); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S.
1, 36 n.45 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942); Stromberg v. Califor-
nia, 283 U.S. 359, 367-68 (1931). The Street Court, therefore, did not need to decide whether
the "act" portion of the statute was valid under the first amendment. See 394 U.S. at 594.
1 See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590-91 (1969) (Court balanced government's
interest in conviction against defendant's free speech right to determine constitutionality
of conviction); see also supra note 17 (state's interest in preserving public safety may outweigh
individual's right to free speech).
' See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590-93 (1969). The Street Court examined four
governmental interests in the defendant's conviction for casting contempt on the flag. See
id. The state has an interest in preventing vocal incitement of unlawful acts, in preserving
the peace, in protecting the sensibilities of the public, and in insuring respect for the na-
tional flag. Id-
' See id. at 591 (Street Court held defendant's words were not incitement to unlawful
action).
I See id. at 592 ("fighting words" are words so inflammatory as to provoke violence
directed at speaker of the words).
I See id (Street Court held that defendant's words were not provocation to breach
the peace); cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 573-74 (1942) (Court upheld
defendant's conviction for speaking "fighting words").
I See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (Court held that any shock effect
from defendant's words resulted from the idea he expressed which state may not suppress).
"1 See id. at 593 (Street Court held that state's interest in ensuring respect for national
flag as symbol of state did not overcome defendant's right to express "defiant or contemp-
tuous" opinions); cf. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 42 (1907) (state has duty to public
to guard against disrespect for flag).
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directly on pure speech, the Street Court held the statute unconstitutional.2
The Supreme Court has established a four-part test for government
regulation of conduct combining both speech and nonspeech elements. 3
In United States v. O'Brien,4  the Supreme Court held that the govern-
ment may regulate communicative conduct, even though the government's
regulation places incidental restrictions on freedom of speech, provided
that the government's regulation meets four requirements.4 5 First, the
government must have constitutional power to regulate the activity." Sec-
ond, the regulation must further a compelling governmental interest.
Third, the governmental interest must be unrelated to the restraint of
free expression.48 Finally, the restriction on the first amendment rights
must be no greater than necessary to further the government's interest. 9
Although the Supreme Court has not applied the O'Brien four-part
test to section 700,5" arguably the statute is an unconstitutional regula-
tion of free speech under the O'Brien four-part test. The statute's pro-
hibition of public flag burning is a regulation of speech because, as the
Supreme Court has held in Stromberg and Barnette, political or emblematic
use of flags is symbolic speech.2 Furthermore, section 700 prohibits
only flag burnings that cast contempt upon the flag.- When a person casts
contempt upon the flag, he necessarily expresses the idea of contempt.'
Therefore, by prohibiting demonstrations of contempt for the flag, sec-
tion 700 regulates the expression of ideas.55
Although section 700 passes the first two parts of the O'Brien
41 See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 581, 590-94 (1969) (Court used balancing test
to decide constitutionality of statute prohibiting words contemptuous of flag); see also supra
note 17 (state's interest in preserving public safety may outweigh individual's free speech
right).
" See infra text accompanying notes 46-49 (O'Brien four-part test for regfflation of
communicative conduct).
" 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
" See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (government regulation may
restrict first amendment rights if regulation passes four-part test).




10 See supra text accompanying note 7 (Supreme Court has declined to decide constitu-
tionality of S 700).
51 See infra text accompanying notes 61-66 (§ 700 is unconstitutional under O'Brien test).
12 See supra text accompanying notes 22-27 (flag is symbolic speech).
18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1976).
See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 593 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (person can-
not treat flag contemptuously without expressing idea of contempt which is speech).
1 See Kime v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 266, 269-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (S 700
requires political expression for conviction), denying cert. to, 673 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir. 1982);
see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 588-89 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (defendant's
conviction under Massachusetts statute for treating flag contemptuously punished the defen-
dant for expressing unpopular views about the flag).
[Vol. 40:1541
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test, the statute fails the O'Brien test's third requirement. 6 Section 700
meets the first requirement of the O'Brien test because Congress has the
implied constitutional power to establish and regulate the uses of the na-
tional flag.7 Congress has an interest in protecting the flag because the
flag is a national symbol: 8 The statute furthers Congress' interest in pro-
tecting the flag as a national symbol by preventing undignified treatment
of the flag.9 Assuming Congress' interest in protecting the flag is substan-
tial, section 700 passes the second part of the O'Brien test." To pass
part three of the O'Brien test, Congress' interest in protecting the flag
must be distinct from the suppression of free speech.' Congress' purpose
in preventing flag burning must not be the regulation of speech.2 Con-
gress protects its interest in the flag by prohibiting the flag's desecration."
Because treating the flag contempuously is speech,64 Congress' interest
in protecting the integrity of the flag is related to the regulation of free
speech. 5 Therefore, section 700 fails the third part of the O'Brien test.6
' See infra text accompanying notes 57-66 (S 700 meets parts one and two of O'Brien
test but fails part three).
' See supra text accompanying note 1 (Congress' constitutional authority to create
and control uses of national flag).
0 See S. REP. No. 1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2507, 2508-09 (public dishonor or destruction of the flag harms entire country
because flag is national patriotic symbol).
' See 18 U.S.C. 5 700(a) (1976) (persons may not cast contempt on American flag by
mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling).
' See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (government regulation of com-
municative conduct must further substantial governmental interest).
1 See id. (government regulation of communicative conduct must be unrelated to
restraint of free speech).
' See Nimmer, supra note 14, at 38-39 (government interest in regulating communicative
conduct must be nonspeech rather than antispeech interest).
See 18 U.S.C. 5 700(a) (1976) (persons may not cast contempt on American flag by
mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling).
" See Kime v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 266, 267-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (prosecu-
tion did not dispute that flag burning was speech), denying cert. to 673 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir.
1982); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (relying on Stromberg and Barnette,
Court held that peace symbol superimposed on American flag is speech).
' See Kime v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 266, 269 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (state's in-
terest in flag as patriotic symbol exists because the flag is symbolic speech), denying cert.
to 673 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir. 1982); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974) (state's
interest in flag as symbol of patriotism and pride in history of country is associated with
the flag's expressive elements). Because S 700 is a direct, not an incidental, restriction on
freedom of speech rights, § 700 fails to meet the fourth requirement of the O'Brien test.
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); supra text accompanying note 49
(fourth requirement of O'Brien test).
I See Kime v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 266, 269 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (S 700 fails
third part of O'Brien test and is unconstitutional regulation of protected speech); denying
cert. to 673 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir. 1982). But see United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 102
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). In Crosson, Crosson and about 75 other students
took part in a protest at the University of Arizona against the Vietnam War. See 462 F.2d
at 98. Crosson was convicted of violating S 700. Id. The Crosson court held that S 700 passed
1983]' 1547
1548 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Since section 700 is a direct, not incidental, regulation of speech,"7
however, courts should not apply the O'Brien four-part test to decide the
statute's constitutionality.6 8 In O'Brien, the government's interest in na-
tional defense justified preventing the destruction of draft registration
certificates.69 Congress prohibited the destruction of draft registration cer-
tificates to insure the efficient raising of armies."° The O'Brien Court found
that the statute prohibiting the destruction of draft registration certificates
did not impinge upon free speech because Congress' interest in preserv-
ing draft cards was unrelated to the suppression of free speech."
The Court distinguished the O'Brien facts from a situation in which the
government's interest in regulating conduct arises because the govern-
ment considers the idea expressed by the conduct harmful. 2 The O'Brien
Court stated that if a statute's purpose was to suppress speech, the statute
could not be upheld as a regulation of noncommunicative conduct. 3 In sec-
tion 700, Congress prohibited only conduct that expresses a contemptuous
idea about the flag and what the flag symbolizes. 4 Congress has not made
mere flag burning a crime." In fact, burning is congressionally sanctioned
as the preferred method of disposing of a worn or tattered flag.76 Burning
the four-part O'Brien test. See id. at 101-02; see also supra text accompanying notes 44-49
(four-part O'Brien test to determine constitutionality of government regulation of expressive
conduct). The Crosson court held that Congress' interest in protecting the flag as a national
symbol was unrelated to the suppression of free speech. See 462 F.2d 101-02. The court
distinguished between writing "I love this country" on the flag and writing "I hate this
country" on the flag. See id. at 100. The Crosson Court implied that both writings are
defacements, but only the latter is contemptuous, and, therefore, a violation of § 700. See
id. The Crosson court's holding permits only patriotic ideas to deface the flag. The Crosson
court's interpretation of S 700, therefore, permits the censorship of unpatriotic ideas, which
is the suppression of speech.
67 See Kime v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 266, 270 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (S 700 pro-
hibits unpopular views rather than mere act of burning American flag), denying cert. to
673 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 106 (9th Cir.) (Brown-
ing, J., dissenting) (S 700 is direct regulation of speech), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
" See 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (O'Brien test is inapplicable to statute regulating con-
duct if government's interest is controlling message contained in conduct).
" Id. at 375, 377-78.
70 Id. at 381.
7 See id. at 375 (statute prohibitng destruction of draft cards is unrelated to suppres-
sion of free speech).
' See id. at 382. The O'Brien Court stated that the four-part test established in O'Brien
was inapplicable to a statute that is aimed at suppressing speech. See id. at 382.
71 See id. (O'Brien test applies only to regulation of noncommunicative conduct).
" See Kime v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 266, 270 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Congress
drafted § 700 to prohibit only constitutionally protected speech), denying cert. to 673 F.2d
1318 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 108 (1972) (Browning, J., dissent-
ing) (§ 700 prohibits idea of contempt for American flag), cert. denied, 409 US. 1064 (1972);
see also 18 U.S.C. S 700(a) (1976) (S 700 prohibits any flag burning that casts contempt upon flag).




a United States flag, therefore, is not intrinsically contemptuous.' The
flag desecration statute's purpose is not to prevent the act of burning
but to suppress the idea expressed by the act. 8 The statute prohibits ex-
pression of the idea of contempt for the flag. 9 The O'Brien four-part test
is not the proper standard for section 700 constitutionality" because
the statute's purpose is not the regulation of noncommunicative conduct."
Although the O'Brien four-part test is inapplicable to section 700
because the statute is a direct regulation of nonverbal expression,82 sec-
tion 700 is not necessarily an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech.'
The correct test of the statute's constitutionality under the first amend-
ment is a test that balances the public's interest in prohibiting contemp-
tuous flag burning against the protester's right to freely express his con-
tempt for the flag.' The government's interest in prohibiting public flag
burning may include protecting the government's special property interest
in the national flag,"5 protecting the sensibilities of witnesses to the flag
" See United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 108 n.7 (9th Cir.) (Browning, J., dissent-
ing) (burning of flag not contemptuous in itself because Congress has authorized flag burn-
ihg as proper method of destroying damaged flag), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
78 See supra text accompanying notes 74-77 (S 700 designed to suppress expression
of contempt for flag).
," Id.; see Kime v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 266, 270 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (S 700
prohibits expression of unpatriotic political views), denying cert. to 673 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir.
1982); Nimmer, supra, note 14, at 53-58 (S 700 is direct regulation of symbolic speech).
' See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (laws directed at suppressing
expression of ideas are not constitutional regulations of noncommunicative conduct); United
States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 106 (9th Cir.) (Browning, J., dissenting) (O'Brien four-part
test applies only to regulation of conduct that incidentally involves expression of ideas),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
" See supra text accompanying notes 74-78 (§ 700's purpose is to suppress expression
of contempt for flag, and is not aimed at preventing flag burning per se). But see S. REP.
No. 1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2507, 2508
(§ 700's purpose is to prevent physical dishonor and destruction of flag not to prohibit com-
munication of ideas).
' See supra text accompanying notes 72-73 (O'Brien test inapplicable to direct regula-
tion of speech).
I See supra text accompanying notes 16-18 (for regulation of speech to be unconstitu-
tional, speech must be protected speech).
" See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411-414 (1974) (Court balanced state's in-
terest in protecting flag against defendant's right of free speech to determine constitu-
tionality of regulation of speech); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590-94 (1969) (Court
balanced state's interest in protecting flag from verbal abuse against defendant's right of
free speech to determine constitutionality of regulation of speech); see also supra text ac-
companying note 17 (Cantwell Court weighed state's interest in protecting public safety
against defendant's right of free speech); see generally Nimmer, supra note 14, 52-57 (discussing
government interests in prohibiting flag desecration).
See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 594-96 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (state
has property interest in national flag); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 615-617 (1969)
(Fortas, J., dissenting) (state's property interest in American flag outweighs defendant's
right to speak contemptuously of flag).
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burning," preventing a breach of the peace caused by the flag burning,'
and protecting the flag from disgrace because it is a national patriotic
symbol." The government may suppress speech in certain circumstances
because the right to free speech is not absolute,89 but the government's
interest in regulating speech must be substantial' and the regulation must
not be overly restrictive."
In his dissent to the Supreme Court's decision in Street v. New York,9"
Justice Fortas stated that the United States has a special property in-
terest in the national flag that places obligations and restrictions on the
uses of even a privately owned flag. 3 For example, the government may
restrict how and when the flag may be displayed 94 and the use of the flag
in advertising. Justice Rehnquist stated, in his dissenting opinion in Smith
v. Goguen,' that the government could prohibit burning the flag just as
the government can prohibit alteration or defacement of the national
currency. Contrary to Justice Fortas and Justice Rehnquist's reasoning,
however, section 700 is drawn too narrowly to qualify as a nonspeech
regulation of the flag. 8 Because the statute prohibits only contemptuous
I Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 591 (1969).
8Id.
8 Id.
" See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (right of free speech
is not absolute); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (freedom of a person
to believe whatever he wants is absolute, but freedom of a person to act however he wants
is not absolute).
I See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949) (government may not suppress free
speech unless speech is likely to produce substantial harm).
' See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (regulation of speech must not
abridge unduly freedom of speech).
92 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
"I See id. at 616-617 (Fortas, J., dissenting). In his dissent to Street v. New York, Justice
Fortas stated that the American flag is a special kind of personal property whose use has
always been regulated by special rules. See id. at 616. Justice Fortas argued that the state's
special property interest in the flag extended to privately owned flags and that the state's
property interest in the flag justified the prohibition against public flag burning. See id. at 617.
1 See id. at 617 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (New York statute regulates display of flag);
see also 36 U.S.C. § 174 (1976) (federal statute regulating times and occasions of flag display);
supra note 1 (Congress' implied power to establish and regulate uses of national flag).
9' See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 616-617 (1969) (Fortas, J, dissenting) (govern-
ment may regulate use of American flag in advertising); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34,
41 (1907) (state law forbidding use of flag for advertisment does not infringe on constitu-
tional rights); see also 36 U.S.C. S 176(i) (1976) (flag should never be used for advertising
purposes).
415 U.S. 566 (1974).
97 See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 595-96 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Con-
gress may protect its special interest in private property); see also 18 U.S.C. S 331 (1976)
(prohibition against mutilation of United States coins); 18 U.S.C. 5 333 (1976) (prohibition
against mutilation of national bank note, bill, or draft).
98 See Nimmer, supra note 14, at 52-53 (§ 700 is overly narrow as property regulation
because statute prohibits only public destruction of property that casts contempt); see also
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 588-90 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (state statute prohibiting
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defacement of the flag, the statute prohibits only desecrations that ex-
press unpatriotic political ideas.9 Therefore, section 700 suppresses free
speech under the appearance of preserving the physical integrity of the
flag as a constitutionally valid regulation may not do. '
The government's property interest in the flag is similar to the govern-
ment's interest in protecting the sensibilities of its citizens from the shock
of witnessing contemptuous treatment of the flag.10 1 The Street Court held
that the state's interest in protecting the sensibilities of the public from
hearing shocking words about the flag did not outweigh a person's first
amendment right to express his opinions concerning the flag. 102 Express-
ing contempt for the flag by burning it is more emotionally shocking that
speaking contemptuous words about the flag."3 The Supreme Court has
held, however, that whether the first amendment protects shocking speech
depends not on the level of offensiveness of the speech,0 4 but on whether
the idea the defendant's speech expressed produced the shocking effect."
0 5
Because section 700 prohibits expression of the idea of contempt for the
flag, the statute prohibits shocking ideas and, therefore, cannot be a con-
stitutionally valid protection of sensibilities of bystanders.0 '
For several decades the Supreme Court has raised no objection to
the government's suppression of speech that presents a clear and present
danger of resulting in imminent violence or unlawful acts.0 7 For example,
the Court has held that the first amendment does not protect "fighting
casting contempt on flag by act is overly narrow as protection of flag's integrity because
statute prohibited only contemptuous desecrations).
" See supra note 98 (statute prohibiting only contemptuous desecrations of flag punishes
communication of ideas about flag).
"® See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (state may not suppress ex-
pression of ideas merely by claiming that regulation of activity preserves public order and
safety).
101 See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 591-92 (1969) (Court considered possible state
interest in protecting passersby from shocking effect of defendant's contempt for flag).
1 See id. at 592 (if offensiveness of defendant's words is attributable to content of
ideas communicated, then government may not suppress defendant's speech).
1 See Nimmer, supra note 14, at 55 (witnessing physical destruction of flag more shocking
than hearing contemptuous words cast upon flag).
10" See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (offensive words have first amend-
ment protection even though defendant could have used less offensive words to express
same idea).
1"I See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (if offensiveness of defendant's
words attributable to content of ideas communicated, then government may not suppress
defendant's speech).
100 See supra text accompanying notes 103-05 (offensive symbolic speech entitled to same
first amendment protection as offensive pure speech).
10I See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (government may abridge speech
that threatens to provoke breach of peace); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (first
amendment does not protect speech that is likely to produce clear and present danger of
great harm to public safety); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (right of free
speech would not protect person who falsely yelled "fire" in theater and caused panic).
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words."'' 8 Even if a particular flag burning resulted in a breach of the
peace, however, section 700 could not support a conviction for breach of
the peace because the statute is written too broadly."' A statute suppres-
sing speech may not unduly restrict freedom of expression."' Because sec-
tion 700's prohibitions extend beyond circumstances likely to produce
violence,"' section 700 is an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech
under the test' for breach of the peace statutes."'
Arguably, the reason section 700 satisfies the requirements of a valid
breach of the peace statute is that contemptuous treatment of the flag,
our national symbol, is likely to cause bystanders to act vilently."'
Although section 700 is too broadly written to be a constitutional breach
of the peace statute,"' the government has an interest in protecting the
flag merely because the national flag is a symbol of patriotism and our
country's history."' Section 700 protects the American flag's symbolic in-
tegrity by prohibiting persons from contemptuously burning the flag."0
In Street v. New York," 7 the Supreme Court held that the government
may not prohibit a person from expressing his disrespectful opinion of
"08 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (first amendment does
not protect words whose utterance inflicts injury or incites violence).
109 See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (breach of peace statute must be
drawn narowly to prohibit only words likely to incite violence); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (law that would permit defendant's conviction for speech that caused anger,
dispute, or unrest is unconstitutional abridgement of free speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 574 (1942) (state statute prohibiting person from addressing offen-
sive or derisive words to another person with intent to annoy was constitutional); see also
18 U.S.C. 5 700 (a) (1976) (S 700 does not prohibit only those flag burnings likely to cause
violence); Note, Flag Burning, Flag Waving and the Law, 4 VAL. U. L. REV. 345, 350 (1970)
(S 700 does not distinguish between flag burning that threatens peace and flag burning
that does not threaten peace). But see Rosenblatt, Flag Desecreation Statutes: History and
Analysis, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 193, 216 (S 700 is constitutional as breach of peace statute).
11 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (breach of peace statute must
not unduly infringe on first amendment rights).
. See supra note 109 (S 700's prohibitions are not restricted to acts likely to cause
violence).
112 See supra text accompanying notes 109-111 (S 700's terms are not sufficiently nar-
row to qualify as valid breach of peace statute).
13 See Rosenblatt, supra note 109, at 216 (S 700 deters violence likely to occur when
someone burns flag).
114 See supra text accompanying notes 109-13 (§ 700's terms are not sufficiently narrow
to qualify as valid breach of peace statute).
"1 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 413 (1974) (flag is symbol of patriotism,
pride in history of country, and service of citizens in peace and war) see also S. REP. No.
1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2507, 2508-09
(dishonor of national symbol harms entire country); Nimmer, supra note 14, at 56-57 (in-
terest in flag as a symbol is interest in protecting idea).
11 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1976).
II 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
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the flag."8 Although the Street Court considered only verbal disrespect
for the flag,"9 first amendment protections apply both to pure speech and
symbolic speech.2 0 Therefore, because section 700 prohibits expression
of disrespect for the flag, section 700 is an unconstitutional infringement
on free speech.2 '
Flag burning is a dramatic form of symbolic speech" that Congress
has suppressed in section 700." Section 700 fails the O'Brien four-part
test for determining the constitutionality of regulating conduct inciden-
tally involving expression,"4 and section 700 fails the balancing test for
determining the constitutionality of regulating speech directly." Flag burn-
ing, therefore, is speech protected under the first amendment, and sec-
tion 700 unconstitutionally infringes this protected right. 6 If Congress
wants to protect the symbolic integrity of the flag, then Congress should
enact a flag protection statute that either prohibits all flag burnings"2
,, See id. at 593-94 (state's interest in protecting flag as political symbol does not per-
mit state to punish disrespect for flag by making contemptuous treatment of the flag a crime).
119 See id. at 594 (Street Court did not decide constitutionality of part of statute pro-
hibiting disrespect for flag by act).
11 See supra text accompanying notes 10-14 (speech means spoken or written words
and communicative conduct). Two reasons might justify treating burning the flag differently
from verbal disrespect for the flag. See supra text accompanying notes 103.07. First, burn-
ing the flag is more emotionally shocking to onlookers than verbal disrespect for the flag.
See supra note 103. Second, because flag burning is more emotionally disturbing than ver-
bal disrespect for the flag, flag burning is more likely than verbal disrespect for the flag
to result in a breach of the peace. See Rosenblatt, supra note 109, at 216. The Cohen Court,
however, has held that whether the first amendment protects offensive speech does not
depend on the level of offensiveness of the defendant's speech. See Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); spra text accompanying notes 101-05. Although flag-burning may
produce or be likely to produce a breach of the peace, S 700 is written too broadly to be
a valid breach of the peace statute. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12 (breach of
peace statute must be restricted to situations likely to produce violence).
,1 See supra text accompanying notes 116-120 (S 700 is unconstitutional prohibition
against contempt for flag); see also Nimmer, supra note 14, at 57 (protection of flag as a
symbol is anti-speech interest).
i 11 See Kime v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 266, 267 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (flag burning
is expressive conduct within first amendment protection of free speech), denying cert. to
673 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1982); See also supra text accompanying notes 21-27 (flag and ac-
tivities associated with flag are symbolic speech).
12 See 18 U.S.C. S 700(a) (1976) (S 700 prohibits person from contemptuously burning
flag in public).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 61-66 (S 700 fails O'Brien four-part test because
government's interest in preventing flag burning is related to suppression of free speech).
" See supra text accompanying notes 92-121 (5 700 fails balancing test because govern-
ment's interests in preventing flag burning are not sufficiently substantial to outweigh per-
son's first amendment right to -express his contempt for flag
*- 1 See supra text accompanying notes 91-27, 61-66, & 92-121 (§ 700 abridges protected
first amendment rights).
12 See United States v. O'Brien, 391"U.S. 367, 377 (1969). Arguably, if Congress pro-
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and not just those that are contemptuous, or that prohibits only flag burn-
ings that are likely to produce immediate violence."8
FREDERICK W. BOGDAN
hibited all flag burnings, then any incidental infringement on free speech would be unrelated
to Congress' interest, for example, in preserving its property interest in the flag. Such
a regulation against all flag burning, therefore, would pass the O'Brien test's third require-
ment. See id. See also supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
12 See supra note 109 (breach of peace statute must be narrowly drawn so that statute
does not unduly abridge free speech).
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